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Globalization, Multinationals and Institutional Diversity  
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to explore the impact of globalization and in particular multinationals on 
diversity within national varieties of capitalism. Do the actions of multinationals create 
more diversity within national systems, do they reduce diversity or do they have 
relatively little impact on diversity within national systems? Drawing on Whitley (2005) 
the paper argues that there are distinctive structures of institutional diversity across 
different national systems. Therefore, the question is not how do MNCs impact on 
institutional diversity per se but how do they impact on these different structures of 
diversity? In order to develop this argument, the paper also differentiates types of 
multinational. The paper uses Dunning’s ‘eclectic’ paradigm (Dunning 2001) and his 
distinction between market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic 
asset seeking in order to identify a range of different MNC activity across manufacturing, 
professional and financial sectors. These different sorts of MNC activity vary across time 
and contexts in terms of their significance. The paper looks in detail at four different 
models of capitalism and examines how the entry of different sorts of multinationals with 
distinctive objectives impacts on the relationships between key social actors which 
underpin and reinforce these models. In this way, it suggests how institutional diversity 
within different types of capitalism may evolve under the impact of MNCs and 
globalization 
 
Key words: institutional diversity; multinationals; models of capitalism
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Introduction 
This paper aims to explore the impact of globalization and in particular multinationals on 
diversity within national varieties of capitalism. Much of the literature examines the 
impact of globalization from a different perspective. It considers whether differences 
between national systems are declining, increasing or staying the same. This convergence 
debate has a powerful hold over much research on national varieties of capitalism. 
However, in recent discussions (Hancke et al. 2007; Morgan et al 2005; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005; Whitley 2007), there has been a gradual shift towards an increasing interest 
in the internal diversity of such systems; how and why does diversity survive and with 
what consequences for institutional change? One major potential influence on diversity 
within national systems emerging from the process of globalization is the growth of 
multinationals. Do the actions of these organizations create more diversity within national 
systems, do they reduce diversity or do they have relatively little impact on diversity 
within national systems? In order to examine this question, the paper firstly examines the 
idea of institutional diversity and how it has been analysed in recent debates. This section 
argues that there are distinctive structures of institutional diversity across different 
national systems. Therefore, the question is not how do MNCs impact on institutional 
diversity per se but how do they impact on these different structures of diversity? The 
second section addresses the issue of multinationals. What sorts of factors drive their 
location decisions and how might these interact with institutional systems? The third 
section looks in detail at the four different models of capitalism and examines how 
multinationals might impact on particular forms of institutional systems.  
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Diversity within national systems: initial considerations 
The concept of institutional diversity has emerged in the analysis of national varieties of 
capitalism as an antidote to over deterministic accounts of structure and resistance to 
change. In this sense, it acts as a counterweight to other versions of the trajectory and 
development of varieties of capitalism where institutional diversity is seen as negative 
from the point of view of economic performance. This approach is most clearly seen in 
Hall and Soskice (2001) and Hall and Gingerich (2004). Hall and Gingerich report that 
‘Where the political economy allows for higher levels of market coordination or higher 
levels of strategic coordination, estimated growth rates are higher than they are when 
there is more variation in the types of coordination present in the political economy’ (Hall 
and Gingerich 2004: 29). High performance may come equally from either of the two 
coherent but very different types (the principle of ‘equifinality’), the liberal market 
economies or the coordinated market economies. Low performance arises where 
economies are incoherent and diverse. As Kenworthy notes about this perspective, ‘for 
economic performance outcomes the decisive question is not ‘Which group are you in?’ 
but rather ‘How coherent are your institutions?’’ (Kenworthy 2006: 72). These authors 
tend to assume that over time institutional systems will either sustain a coherent set of 
institutions or, ceteris paribus, will migrate towards one of the poles of coherence in 
order to improve their economic performance. Although there is recognition that 
resistance to this shift is possible, the result is to downplay internal diversity as a 
permanent feature of institutional settings in favour of characterising societies in terms of 
dominant and distinctive modes of coordination. Change emerges from modifications to 
existing practices within the dominant system of institutions. As Hall explains, ‘Varieties 
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of Capitalism are constituted not by static sets of institutions but by distinctive 
trajectories that are institutionally conditioned, as new practices are developed to cope 
with the problems generated by past practice and integrated into a network of interacting 
institutions, some of which remain stable as others change’ (Hall 2007: 76).  Thus change 
emerges from within the adaptive processes of the dominant institutional pattern and has 
little to do with any broader diversity in the system.  
 
Other authors take a very different perspective from that of Hall and colleagues. Crouch, 
for example, is sceptical of the institutional coherence argument, suggesting that ‘mixed 
institutions are always likely to be more useful for change and innovation, and more 
resilient than those that reproduce similar characteristics over a wide institutional range’ 
(Crouch 2005: 59). Crouch emphasizes the heterogeneity and diversity of institutions in 
particular societies and envisages that actors will respond to change pressures by 
engaging in experimental behaviour which will draw on combinations of institutions 
rather than adapting the single dominant institutional logic. Firms tend to be seen as 
active in developing institutional supports and therefore central to processes of 
institutional reform and change.  This process of what Crouch terms ‘recombinant 
governance’ and institutional entrepreneurship is open-ended and under-determined, 
shaped by the skilful use of firstly existing institutions, secondly new emerging 
technologies and market opportunities and thirdly, power resources. Institutional diversity 
is the very heart of change. It is through using diversity and engaging in processes of 
recombinant governance that localities, regions and nation-states can be institutionally 
innovative. Crouch’s argument reflects a broader trend favouring the role of historical 
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analysis, contingency and politics which can ‘incorporate social compromises rather than 
either functionalist or purposive logic [and]are likely to describe societies containing 
much internal diversity and unresolved contradictions and tensions’ (Crouch 2005: 64; 
also see e.g. Djelic and Quack 2007; Morgan et al 2005; Morgan 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003; 2005). A further impetus to this argument has 
been research on transitions in Central and Eastern Europe which has revealed the role of 
politics, the impact of international actors, the influence of pre-transformation institutions 
and actors in developing a variety of models of capitalism in these areas (e.g. Bohle and 
Greskovits 2007; Lane 2005, 2007; King and Szelenyi 2005; King 2007) and the way in 
which institutional recombination and diversity is constructed (Stark and Bruszt 1998; 
Stark 2001).  
 
The problem with simply asserting institutional diversity, however, is that it potentially 
dissolves into a set of historically specific descriptions of how particular contexts have 
evolved. It therefore begins to lose the theoretical value that the varieties of capitalism 
approach has for applying common concepts and frameworks across contexts and 
enabling systematic comparative study. One way out of this has been developed by 
Whitley (2005: 2007). He suggests that the establishment of what he terms ‘cohesive and 
distinctive business systems at the national level’ varies across contexts in a way which 
can be systematically related to historically emergent characteristics of particular 
societies. Three factors which emerge from his analysis are relevant here. The first is the 
degree and nature of the role of the state in economic life. The second is the way in which 
key economic actors relate to the state and in particular whether they are incorporated 
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into the state and organized or influenced by the state. Associated with this is the way in 
which the collective organization of economic actors is sponsored, shaped or undermined 
by state action. Finally, there is focus on the degree to which the state and/or collective 
actors create nationally binding systems of institutions that shape and standardize the 
organization of markets – for capital, for goods and services and for labour.  
 
Whitley distinguishes four types of systems with varying degrees of institutional cohesion 
and diversity. He suggests that liberal market economies have regulatory states which 
concentrate on setting the rules of economic action but are not strongly interventionist in 
other areas. They do not engage in strong institutional design processes, partly because 
actors are decentralised and poorly organized into peak level associations, preferring to 
retain the autonomy to respond to market changes quickly and without wide consultation 
and cooperation with others. Sanctions and rewards encouraging actors to follow a 
dominant institutional design are weak, tending to emerge from market processes rather 
than regulative or state level activity. Such societies are likely to be characterised by a 
variety of institutional clusterings of varying strengths, defined by a combination of 
sectoral or geographical specificity.  This clearly reflects the dominant role of market 
relations in these contexts.  Weak central institutions allow the survival, emergence, or 
development of diverse institutional patterns so long as market failure is kept at bay. This 
explains, for example, why a number of authors (see e.g. Campbell et al, 1991; Herrigel 
and Wittke 2005; Taylor 2004; Whitford 2005) have seen considerable institutional 
diversity and innovation in the USA which in other contexts is treated unproblematically 
as the paradigm case of dominant liberal institutions.  
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By contrast, Whitley argues, other societies constrain institutional variety and diversity in 
distinctive ways. He identifies 3 main types. In societies with strong interest group 
representation (which he labels ‘inclusive corporatist’), dominant actors such as the state, 
peak level associations of large firms and trade unions have sought to avoid the 
emergence of a cheap wage, differentiated sector by developing regulations and rules 
which apply across the society as a whole. They thus create a relatively standardized and 
high platform, particularly of wages, taxes, working conditions, skills and rewards 
together with a welfare and training system that buttresses these firm level characteristics. 
As a result, institutional diversity is relatively low in such systems. This model has 
traditionally characterised Germany and Sweden and, with certain important variations, 
other Nordic states. 
 
By contrast, Whitley identifies what he terms a ‘business corporatist’ model. In these 
systems, the dominant actors consist of the state and big business. Big business is linked 
to the state through a set of relationships that are organized through firms and through 
various peak associations of business where a strong collective voice for business exists. 
Labour organization, on the other hand, is weakly developed and labour is kept away 
from the main levers of power. The weakness of labour means that ‘the national 
standardization of labour representation and bargaining systems across sectors and firm 
type remains restricted’ (Whitley 2005: 201). Large firms operate closed internal labour 
markets which in return for long-term employment guarantees set high standards of 
training, performance and commitment for their employees. The state in conjunction with 
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the banking system shares part of the risk of these long-term guarantees by managing the 
competition process and facilitating forms of cooperation over large scale projects. Firms 
tend to cohere into groups which also reduces potential risks from specialization. Finally, 
part of the risk is laid off to small firms which act as buffers for the large firms, 
expanding and contracting according to market demand. Such systems are characterised 
by a strong segmentation between big business and its networks supported by the state 
and the banking system and a periphery of small, unstable and marginal firms struggling 
to survive. Such systems have a form of internal diversity but it is of a limited nature. 
Japan is the main example of this model. 
 
Whitley’s final category is that of the ‘developmental state’. Developmental states tend to 
discourage the emergence of strong intermediary associations amongst both business and 
labour. Instead the state tends to focus on particular firms and sectors in order to generate 
internationally competitive capabilities. These firms are given access to advantageous 
credit arrangements and generally provided with a protective home environment in which 
they can build and develop their capabilities, usually based on mass production. Firms 
and individuals that are trusted by the state are likely to develop hierarchically organized 
business groups, which link together a number of diverse business areas. The state is also 
central to the education and training system which becomes framed in terms of a national 
mission and supported through strong nationalist symbolism. However it is a nationalism 
in which a particular definition of national economic interest associated with the large 
business groups is dominant whilst small firms (and labour) are excluded. As a result, 
Whitley argues that ‘there are likely to be considerable differences between companies 
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and sectors supported by the state and those that are relatively neglected’ (Whitley 2005: 
207). Such systems are therefore characterised by significant institutional and firm level 
diversity within a context where the ability to control the state and access to the resources 
of the state is a key issue. This model has been associated to varying degrees with the 
development of Asian economies, most obviously South Korea but also Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Taiwan (Wade 2004). 
 
These processes can be summarised in the following table: 
 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)  
From this perspective the nature and degree of institutional diversity within a society is 
predominantly shaped by the power of three groups of actors (the state, business and 
labour), their degree of collective organization and their ability to enter into alliances and 
credible commitments. In order to understand whether institutional diversity is likely to 
increase or decrease, therefore, it is necessary to understand how these features may be 
reconstituted, in the current example, by the actions of multinationals. 
 
Multinationals  
Why might multinationals have an effect on the relationships between these actors and in 
this way on processes of institutional diversity? Multinationals are essentially market 
actors; their goals and strategies are driven by issues of market positioning not by issues 
of institutional change and redesign. This is not to say that multinationals may not engage 
in forms of lobbying that are directed explicitly to institutional change, but rather that 
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what is of interest here is the indirect impact of their actions on the reproduction of the 
dominant model of institutional diversity. For this purpose, it is necessary therefore to 
draw on some basic insights into why multinationals develop. In a recent overview of 
literature on international business, Dunning summarised his ‘eclectic’ paradigm in which 
MNC activity  
“rests on the juxtaposition of three inter-related factors. 
(1) The competitive (or O specific) advantages of existing or potential MNEs…. 
(2) The locational (or L specific) advantages of particular countries in offering 
complementary assets… 
(3) The propensity of the firms possessing the O specific advantages to combine these 
with foreign based assets, by fdi, rather than by (or in addition to) the market 
mechanism.” (Dunning 2001: 43). 
From this he suggests that there are four main types of MNC activity: ‘market seeking, 
resource seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking’ (Dunning 2001: 44). 
‘Market seeking’ refers to accessing new markets for the MNC’s products and services. 
Resource seeking (which is of less concern in this paper) is primarily the act of ensuring 
access to key material resources such as oil, minerals and agricultural products. 
Efficiency seeking refers to the task of reducing the costs of factors of production such as 
labour but also land as well as achieving economies of scale through developing large 
scale facilities concentrated in particular geographical areas. Strategic asset seeking refers 
to the securing of key assets for the development of the firm; these include access to 
knowledge, skilled labour, ancillary services and capital. The degree to which any one of 
these types of activities outweighs any other will clearly be highly variable. The decision-
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making of a multinational is seldom driven by simply one of these factors but rather as 
the ‘eclectic’ paradigm suggests by varying combinations of these factors. 
 
In the development of these ‘seeking’ strategies, MNCs have been supported by broader 
developments in the world economy. It is worth briefly recapitulating on the two phases 
of this process since the 1950s. From the 1950s through to the 1970s, the global economy 
was characterised by an effort to open up national markets for competition and FDI. 
Backed by the dominant power of the US, the Bretton Woods international institutions 
and the use of the dollar as an international currency, overt protectionism was reduced in 
many countries and FDI (mainly via US based multinationals) increased. New markets 
for manufactured goods were opened up and US multinationals in particular established 
production facilities outside their home base. However, many goods and services 
remained protected in particular countries and regions. Moreover capital flows were 
controlled inhibiting extensive use of FDI.  
 
The second phase of the global economy reflects a steady and concerted effort on the part 
of public and private actors to consolidate and extend this opening up process. Under the 
rules of GATT and now WTO, it became increasingly difficult for states to maintain 
protectionism as a formal policy. Capital flows were liberalized and the deregulation of 
financial markets, the floating of currencies and the opening up of markets to foreign 
investors all facilitated a greater marketization of economic life. In recent work, Djelic 
has examined how marketization has moved from being an ‘intellectual agenda to global 
policy-making’. She argues that ‘since the early 1980s, the spread of marketization has 
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meant, in reality, deep transformations with economic, social and political dimensions. 
Market-oriented macro-economic policies – privatization, deregulation and liberalization 
– have spread rapidly….Trade liberalization also progressed…Marketization has also 
translated into financial liberalization…The same happened with the idea of competition. 
The fight for competitive markets has become a nearly global one’ (Djelic 2006: 71).  
In this context, MNCs have faced far fewer state level barriers to their various strategies 
than previously. However, as Djelic herself recognizes, there are limits to the 
marketization process; 
‘Limits stem from political and ideological resistance….Limits stem from also from local 
translation, editing and hybridization….Limits are also visible in processes of 
‘decoupling’: the marketization revolution does not always go down from discourse to 
implementation.  One naturally has to add a geographic if not cultural dimension to that 
mapping of limits’ (op.cit.: 73) 
This idea of limits can be useful linked back to the previous analysis of institutional 
diversity within national systems. National systems will differ in terms of their resistance 
to this marketization according to how the interests and capabilities of their leading 
coalitions and other less powerful actors are affected.  
 
Two points are worth making before proceeding further. Firstly, much of the literature on 
MNCs and varieties of capitalism is concerned to argue that the way in which MNCs act 
is fundamentally shaped by their home institutional context (see e.g. the contributions in 
Morgan et al. 2001; Ferner et al. 2006; Geppert and Mayer 2005). This is relevant to the 
discussion here and will be referred to but it is not the central theme. Secondly, there is a 
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tendency in these discussions to define multinationals predominantly from the point of 
view of manufacturing industry and to examine their impact in terms of the effect of the 
MNC in developing, changing or adapting to current regimes of production within 
factory-lie settings. However, this is an unhelpful and restrictive definition of MNCs in 
the current period. The growth of multinational firms in professional, financial and 
business services is a particular feature of this second phase of the global economy as 
discussed earlier (on international law firms, see Morgan and Quack 2005; Dezelay and 
Garth 1996; on management consultancies see Kipping and Engwall 2004; McKenna 
2006; Morgan et al. 2006; on business services, see Miozzo and Grimshaw 2006; on 
global financial services, see Clark and Wojcik 2007; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005; 
Porter 2005. Cases on international professional services also appear in Almond and 
Ferner 2006; Pettigrew and Fenton 2001).  From a market-seeking perspective, one of the 
most important trends of the last decade has been the way in which financial and 
professional service firms have internationalized to seek out new markets. Indeed, this 
goes hand in hand with creating the conditions for new markets to emerge in contexts 
where existing firms have little expertise or interest. This is a strong theme in the 
discussion which follows. 
 
Institutions, diversity and multinationals 
In this section, each of the four types of institutional diversity described by Whitley are 
examined in terms of how multinationals are likely to impact on relations between key 
actors and through this on institutional diversity.  
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Liberal Market economies 
As has already been suggested, liberal market economies have potential for the greatest 
diversity. In these systems, the collective organizations of employers and employees are 
weak. The state sets the rules of the game by setting the standards for how markets 
operate. These standards are primarily driven to maximize market processes whilst 
avoiding potential market inefficiencies. Rules on competition and collusion aim to 
provide a common platform for market processes to work. Labour markets are 
constructed to be flexible and reduce constraints on employers’ ability to restructure 
firms. Capital markets are based on underpinning rules that determine who is able to trade 
and how they can do so. These rules are constructed on the logic of making markets work 
more efficiently. ‘Special interests’ are in theory excluded from this process through 
‘special expertise’ may be included. The result is that whilst labour is effectively kept out 
of the process, the interests of various non-labour actors, e.g. the senior managers of large 
companies, lawyers, bankers and consultants, are incorporated.   
 
In formal terms, a rule based system which aims to facilitate competition in product 
markets, labour markets and financial markets enables any firm to compete for market 
share or strategic assets subject to conformity with the rules. For example, the relative 
openness of labour markets means that the strategic asset of expertise is relatively easily 
available to a multinational. In such systems, expertise tends to be individualised and 
marketized. Internal labour markets are not powerful and individuals are generally 
willing to move around, selling their skills to the highest bidder and building short term 
teams and project groupings for specific tasks.  It is therefore relatively easy for a 
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multinational to construct teams of experts in industries simply by paying high salaries 
and bonuses. Thus the financial markets of Wall Street and the City of London are 
increasingly populated by banking institutions based in very different national systems. 
This occurs even in market segments that are considered to be highly advanced and 
liberalized. For example, the French banks Societe Generale and Credit Lyonnais have 
been highly active in derivatives trading in the City of London as have Deutsche Bank 
from Germany and UBS from Switzerland. They have been able to enter the markets and 
purchase expertise on derivatives markets in a way which was much more difficult and 
uncertain when, for example, US and European banks sought to develop an institutional 
investment banking nexus in Japan in the period 1995-2003 (Morgan and Kubo 2005).  
 
Whitley argues that firms in such systems are ‘isolated hierarchies’; they are not 
embedded in strong institutional settings and are reliant on their own resources and 
market processes for survival rather than in a risk-sharing situation with the state, long-
term banking capital or networks of suppliers and customers.  However, it is clear that 
there are no formal barriers to them setting up what might be termed ‘weak’ institutional 
solutions to their coordination problems, e.g. creating longer term relations with suppliers 
and employees in particular geographical or sectoral locations (on the processes in the US 
see Hecksher and Adler 2006; Herrigel and Wittke 2005; Whitford 2005; Zeitlin and 
Whitford 2004; on the example of how Japanese MNCs developed their own supporting 
institutions in the UK see Elger and Smith 1994; 2005; Oliver and Wilkinson 1992; 
Morgan et al. 2002; Whitley et al. 2003). These are described here as weak because they 
are often time limited existing in a context where actors (including the MNC itself) may 
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have opportunities to withdraw from credible commitments and move on. However, there 
may be gains for the actors under certain conditions to develop within this weak 
institutional order because it provides relative stability in an uncertain world.  
 
In summary, liberal market systems are open to multinationals from outside so long as 
rules are followed. These outsiders have a certain amount of freedom about how far to go 
in terms of conforming to these rules. Certain strategic assets may be denied to them if 
they do not conform to particular rules (most obviously in the capital markets) but others 
will still be accessible (such as expert labour). In theory they can pick and choose how far 
to integrate with this system but one possibility is that in their adaptation process, they 
may evolve weak institutional orders. In this sense, institutional diversity in these systems 
is reinforced by the entry of MNCs from different institutional systems. 
 
Inclusive corporatist contexts 
These contexts are resistant to diversity and supportive of standardisation and 
homogenisation of institutions. The traditional terminology of the ‘social partners’ 
reflects the balance of power that has existed and that has been embedded in the model of 
inclusive corporatism. What is attractive about inclusive corporatist systems to MNCs 
and what relevance might this have for institutional diversity? 
 
Clearly there are certain aspects that are not attractive. Broadly speaking, inclusive 
corporatist systems have high built-in costs of doing business in terms of the regulatory 
system and the labour market system. The regulatory system tends to be extensive and 
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unlike liberal market economies, prescriptive in its nature, with rules specifying what 
must be done and what must not be done. Associated with this, the rights of labour and 
the responsibilities of employers towards labour are extensive. Internal labour markets 
are relatively strong and external labour markets not deeply developed. Multinationals are 
therefore unlikely to come to such systems in order to establish more efficient systems 
since costs are likely to be high and accessing expert knowledge difficult. Inclusive 
corporatist systems are characterised by strong linkages between groups of firms in 
localities and in employers’ associations which also makes it difficult for outsiders to 
access strategic assets. Where MNCs do enter for these sorts of reasons, they are under 
pressure to adapt to the existing system and therefore do not enhance institutional 
diversity but rather reinforce its existing low level. 
 
Germany illustrates many of these tensions. On the one hand, it is a large market and is 
well know for the quality of its products derived from high levels of training and close 
inter-firm relationships. It therefore has some attraction to foreign investment which is 
interested particularly in accessing skills and high level of expertise in engineering and 
manufacturing. 60% of employment in FDI into Germany in 2004 was in manufacturing 
with transport equipment accounting for 15% (Deutsche Bundesbank 2006: 46). 
However, the same report argues that in terms of recent inflows, FDI made up less than 
2% on average of domestic non-residential private fixed investments on average in the 
period 1990-2004. Germany’s position in terms of inward FDI was barely changing over 
this time. It seems therefore that the changes which were occurring in Germany at this 
time towards more decentralised bargaining, towards concession bargaining and towards 
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various forms of flexible labour were not sufficient to change the general perception that 
the German labour market remained coordinated and relatively inflexible (Streeck and 
Hassel 2004; Hassel 2007; Hall 2007). Those US MNCs which did locate in Germany  
‘challenged the German system of employment relations on a number of counts and 
simple conformance with the German system was rare’ (Almond and Ferner 2006: 285). 
There was therefore change occurring in the German system of manufacturing and MNCs 
were contributing in a minor way to debate and discussion on this issue but the primary 
constraints and primary actors were endogenous to the system. Institutional diversity is 
still weak as far as institutions surrounding manufacturing are concerned. 
 
However, this underestimates the market seeking activity of particular sorts of MNCs, 
specifically those in finance and in professional services. Inclusive corporatist systems 
have been relatively weak in terms of the development of capital markets. Capital has 
traditionally been supplied on a relatively long term basis by a variety of types of 
financial institutions, often with strong local roots and ownership structures that are 
public or cooperative as much as private. Firms have been owned by dominant coalitions 
of banks and other firms who have tended to keep their shares over the long term. The 
auditing responsibilities of firms, whilst extensive, have been primarily directed at the 
state rather than shareholders and company accounts have given sparse information to 
enable small investors or more short term investors to judge about buying and selling 
shares. These have all been vital ingredients in systems which have enabled firms to plan 
over the medium to long term but also provide insiders with the benefits of private 
control over public resources, something that can be expected to particularly exercise 
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trade unions in such systems. The capital markets, in terms of stock market activity, bond 
markets and other associated actors such as investment banks, brokers and corporate 
lawyers have played a relatively minor role compared to banks and insurance companies. 
 
However, it can be argued that this is changing in some fundamental ways as a result of 
multinational activity and this will affect the nature of institutional diversity inside 
inclusive corporatist systems. This can be seen from a ‘market-seeking’ perspective. 
Inclusive corporatist systems have lacked strong capital markets or strong actors with 
expertise and resources in those markets. In market seeking terms, this offers an 
opportunity to global investment banks, international law firms and others to leverage 
their existing assets and engage in a process to build this market and benefit from its 
expansion. For example, UNCTAD reports that Germany is the third most favoured 
location for foreign affiliates of the top 50 financial TNCs in 2005 (UNCTAD 2007: 27). 
Similarly, German corporate law firms became a very important target for UK based law 
firms as they sought to develop their global reach; the largest global law firms are now 
increasingly those UK and US based firms which have built their internationalisation 
process on mergers with German law firms (Morgan and Quack 2005; 2006). The largest 
German banks in alliance with their corporate lawyers have reconstituted themselves 
inside Germany and in global terms into the spheres of investment banking and corporate 
finance and away from the traditional universal banking/patient capital model. In doing 
so, they have started to reshape the financial sector by creating a clearer division than 
ever between international banks and their international clients (German MNCs) and 
regional and local banks with their continued strong trust based relationship with 
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mittelstand sector firms (Deeg 2005). This space has also opened up the German context 
for new sorts of international investors though the impact of these is more complex than 
can be subsumed simply under the heading of the victory of shareholder value (Goyer 
2007). 
 
In terms of the exogenous global policy making environment, formal constraints on the 
presence of foreign banking institutions and other professional services have declined. It 
is effectively impossible to keep MNCs out of these sectors purely on grounds of 
protection of existing home based firms and to make the case on broader grounds of 
public policy is also increasingly difficult. For the financial and legal MNCs themselves, 
therefore, expanding into these markets is an effective expansionist strategy. It is doubtful 
that in itself this would be enough to bring about change in the system (as can be seen 
from the subsequent contrasting case of business corporatist models). It is how this 
interacts with potential fractures in the dominant alliances that is crucial. Essentially if 
outsiders can enter the inclusive corporatist system and begin to build a new institutional 
complex around financial markets, existing actors in this sort of territory face a challenge 
of adaptation. Do they leave this new development to the outsider, risking the danger that 
their existing institutional complex will simply decay as other actors transfer their 
allegiance to this new model or do they engage with the new model (see for example the 
different models of institutional change discussed in Streeck and Thelen 2005)? Clearly 
this depends partly on expectations about whether the new model will attract other actors 
towards it. This may well be the case where the existing model is failing to reproduce 
itself effectively because of changed global conditions (e.g. reducing the ability of firms 
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to conform to the expected standards of remuneration, stability of employment and skill 
based training). In such contexts more dynamic capital markets may seem to offer to 
firms new opportunities for restructuring that were not available previously and this 
seems to be the case in relation to German financial and legal organizations which have 
moved towards a new model. This process in turn could be reinforced where these firms 
also believe that they can gain markets in other contexts if they learn about this new 
model and begin to compete outside its home base. If this is coupled with a demand from 
their clients for them to be present in markets outside their home base in order to 
maintain their business relationships, the pressure may become overwhelming. Even the 
representatives of labour may see this as a positive development since corporate 
governance processes in such systems whilst in theory involving employees may actually 
be controlled by an elite of insider managers and their business allies on the board. 
Labour may therefore see increased transparency coming from more active capital 
markets as an opportunity to reduce the power of insiders and hold them more 
accountable for decisions.  
 
The consequence of all this may be a fracturing in the uniformity that characterised the 
original inclusive corporatist system. Outside financial and legal MNCs together with 
insider firms in the same sectors encouraged by large corporate clients may gradually 
migrate towards the new capital market model, effectively splitting off from other actors 
in the system and building their own institutional setting. Labour’s role in this may be 
ambiguous, concerned about the potential effects of growing shareholder value rhetoric 
and actions emerging from the capital markets but supporting the shift towards greater 
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transparency and accountability that may emerge. The result is the expectation of greater 
institutional diversity being introduced into the inclusive corporatist system as a result of 
the active presence of more financial and professional service multinationals. This 
diversity is occurring more rapidly and effectively in Germany in the financial and legal 
arenas than it is in manufacturing where many of the institutions still remain strong. 
 
In summary, the argument suggests that inclusive corporatist systems are not conducive 
to MNCs seeking to access new strategic assets or seeking efficiency enhancing gains 
from relocation. However in the current context, they do offer possibilities for particular 
types of MNCs to expand their markets. These are MNCs that are essentially seeking to 
leverage their assets from experience and knowledge of the working of capital markets. 
Inclusive corporatist systems have been traditionally weak in these areas but external and 
internal pressures are creating new market opportunities which financial and legal MNCs 
are taking advantage of. Local firms are being forced by this pressure as well as their own 
clients to also develop these skills at home and abroad. Thus capital markets are likely to 
continue to grow rapidly in inclusive corporatist systems, in effect bringing institutional 
diversity into a system that was uniform and standardised. The consequence of this is to 
create one more pressure on the dominant alliance and potentially to split off the more 
capital market oriented firms from firms which are more local and more financed through 
self investment and the traditional banking system as well as placing the role of labour 
under new conditions and potentially changing how it responds to managements. 
  
Business corporatist forms and the impact of multinationals 
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Business corporatist forms leave firms to organize their own labour management policies 
whilst bringing together large firms and the government in supportive networks. Large 
firms provide individuals with material, symbolic and cultural meanings over long time 
periods. Small firms and their employees, on the other hand, are left to survive as best 
they can in a system where they are relatively powerless except in local pork-barrel 
politics.  
 
Business corporatist systems share some features with inclusive corporatist systems in 
terms of their attractiveness (or rather lack of attractiveness) to MNCs from outside. The 
disincentives to MNC investments are quite high in relation to efficiency seeking 
behaviour and strategic asset seeking activity. The dominance within the large firm sector 
of internal labour markets and the existence of firm specific skill sets means that there is 
a very weak external labour market for any sort of skilled or professional labour. In their 
study of the entry of US and European investment banks into the Japanese context, 
Morgan and Kubo showed how difficult it was initially to lure expert analysts away from 
lifetime employment in Japanese banks and to get them to join the more highly paid and 
more specialized foreign banks (Morgan and Kubo 2005). Market incentives alone would 
be insufficient to pull individuals out of internal labour markets since it is hard to develop 
reward systems that would compensate for the loss of the promise of long-term 
employment. So it is very difficult for overseas MNCs to attract labour on shorter term 
more flexible contracts without paying exceptionally high salaries, a strategy which can 
only begin to be viable in high value sectors such as investment banking.  
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In these systems, knowledge is deeply embedded in long-term relationships between 
employees and firms and between firms in business group networks, sometimes formal, 
at other times informal. Overseas MNCs are unlikely to be able to access this expertise. It 
is also characteristic of such systems that whilst final product market competition may be 
intense, getting access to these final markets is not an open process. Here, long term 
informal relationships between business group firms at different points in the value chain 
up to the point of retail sale as well as intricate connections between the state, regulators 
and big business make it difficult for newcomers to get into the market. Overall barriers 
to outside MNCs remain high even though formal mechanisms of market protection may 
have been dismantled. Not surprisingly, Japan which most resembles this model, receives 
very low levels of inward FDI and on the UNCTAD composite measure for 
transnationality is the lowest of all the developed countries. 
 
Is the business corporatist system subject to the same sort of pressure for opening up and 
change that exists for the inclusive corporatist system? Certainly there are some 
similarities. The global environment for the development of capital markets is the same. 
Similarly business corporatist economies like inclusive corporatist economies have 
weakly developed capital markets. In theory, therefore there is an opportunity for 
overseas MNCs in finance and law to gain a significant role in establishing a new 
institutional order around capital markets. But there are also some significant differences 
and these relate to endogenous features of the business corporatist system.  
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Because labour has been so much weaker and the system is characterised not by 
uniformity and standardisation but by segmentation (the large firms separated from the 
small ones) and the existence of business groups, there is already a degree of flexibility 
and differentiation built into the system. The weakness of labour means that firms do not 
have prolonged negotiations with unions over the distribution of surpluses. The weakness 
of the capital markets means that they also do not have to negotiate with shareholders. In 
effect, the senior managers retain strong control over the distribution of these funds. So 
long as the firm’s social contract at the point of production is working effectively (and 
generating the high levels of quantity and quality that generally characterise this system), 
firms are not likely to seek to constrain themselves by going to capital markets, 
particularly where they have a working banking system that can also provide some 
patient capital if necessary. As a result it is not so strongly in their interests to split from 
other groups of actors and support the growth of capital markets and outside financial 
multinationals. In fact, quite the contrary, as the growth of a strong capital market 
threatens the firm and the business group centred model of consensus and surplus 
distribution, and thus senior managers are likely to be very cautious about encouraging it. 
Similarly the banks that are intricately connected into this system will be cautious for fear 
of how such developments may impact on existing formal and informal networks of 
cooperation and support. There also seems no obvious reason why the state, whilst 
complying with formal rules about the opening of markets, would seek to weaken its 
networks and the system of informal consultation with business by encouraging overseas 
multinationals to enter when such firms may not feel the same level of loyalty or 
deference to state bureaucrats. Labour, in turn, is weakly organized and excluded from 
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these processes so any concerns such as those in inclusive corporatist systems that 
corporate governance benefits the private interests of insiders is not likely to emerge. 
 
On the other hand, it is no doubt the case that the relative weakness of the capital markets 
in these systems will appear as a highly attractive market opportunity, particularly for 
multinational investment banks. It can be expected that such multinationals will make 
tentative forays into these contexts in the hope of opening up major market opportunities. 
Particularly where such multinationals buy into existing operations and therefore receive 
access to existing informal networks and connections with other firms, with regulators, 
with politicians and with the state, the chances of survival may be good but this will come 
at the expense of not seeking to aggressively remake the market on more liberal 
deregulated lines. It will be more difficult to start from scratch and grow beyond being a 
niche player. 
  
In conclusion, given the broader international environment, it can be expected that 
business corporatist systems will open up in formal terms in order to meet their 
international obligations. However, the intricate connections between firms, regulators, 
politicians and state bureaucrats which characterise such systems are barely threatened by 
a formal process of opening up. These connections make it extremely difficult for 
overseas multinationals to gain any advantages from locating into business corporatist 
systems. One of the main significant weaknesses from a liberal market perspective is the 
poorly developed capital market system. This offers a potential market opportunity to 
financial multinationals but unlike inclusive corporatist systems, it is not clear why the 
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informal ties linking actors together should begin to fragment and allow a rapid and 
significant expansion of capital markets supported by overseas financial institutions. 
Instead what seems more likely as in Japan is some limited market penetration through 
acquisition and small niche oriented organic growth strategies. However, in Japan, this 
market penetration is very subject to changes in international economic conditions and 
can ebb and flow according to the context rather than attaining a steady state of 
incremental growth. As a whole, therefore, institutional diversity in the system is barely 
affected.   
 
The developmental state 
This model of capitalism is characterised by a strong central state that sponsors particular 
individuals and firms (often closely allied to the dominant political party or faction) to 
create world class companies, based on the provision of cheap finance, subsidised 
infrastructure, careful use of barriers to trade in certain areas, use of coercion where 
necessary to subdue the demands of labour. Developmental states are likely to be highly 
focused on developing and sustaining national unity through the proclamation of national 
missions and the support of national champions. They are unfavourable to internal 
opposition, particularly from labour, ethnic or environmental movements and 
democratisation processes are constrained usually into one party states with opposition 
weak and subject to repression. In some contexts, this is linked to forms of crony 
capitalism, though in others, such as Singapore and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, a 
strong nationalist and bureaucratic ethos seems to prevent corruption and enable the state 
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to play a more ‘objective’ role in the development process (Wade 2004; Woo-Cummings 
1999; Kim 1998; Low 1998) 
. 
Developmental states tend to be resistant to MNC entry in their early stages since they are 
trying to build local industry.  Their economic strategy is built on the development of 
large scale home based industry which predominantly exports its output. They therefore 
tend to protect the home market as a small but guaranteed part of their market. As these 
firms are built from capital supplied under favourable terms through the state, there is 
resistance to allowing outside firms access to the same rights. From the point of view of 
an MNC such contexts are likely to lack any strong locational assets such as high skills or 
knowledge generating institutions. In these early stages, local industry is often based on 
relatively simple technologies developed or copied from overseas models but put to use 
in ways which generate large economies of scale allowing exports that are competitively 
priced in the international market. One major asset which is required at this stage is 
capital but rather than draw in overseas capital which may lead to a loss of control of the 
process, capital is generated through mechanisms of extracting a surplus from the rural 
peasantry and keeping the share of labour and wages as low as possible, both of  which 
are processes facilitated by the nationalistic and repressive nature of the state. As part of 
nationalistic developmental projects, these states have pushed money into improving 
basic education in maths, science and literacy and expanding higher education massively 
(Brown et al 2000) in order to facilitate industrial upgrading as well as investing more 
heavily in research and development.  
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These moves have been necessary as international institutions such as the WTO, the 
World Bank and the IMF have committed to liberalizing access to markets and 
competition for low wage and low skill jobs has become more intense. This has led to an 
effort to reach out to foreign capital in order to increase investment and to foreign MNCs 
as a way of speeding up technological and firm level development (Kim and Nelson 
2000). In South Korea, this was an element of the response to the Asian financial crisis 
and the IMF bailout. Some of the chaebol business groups had parts of their assets sold 
off to US companies, most notably Daewoo which went bankrupt in 1999 and had its car 
manufacturing sold to General Motors. In other respects, however, the chaebols ‘continue 
to call the shots, accounting for 60% of exports. The economy remains dominated by 
large conglomerates to a degree greater than any other capitalist nation’ (Armstrong 
2008: 123). This is reflected in the fact that in 2007, the former head of Hyundai 
construction, one of the country’s main chaebols, was elected President of South Korea. 
Thus the state remains entwined with the chebols in spite of some restructurings in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and IMF involvement. Alongside this, however, the 
investment in education, training and R+D that has taken place in Korea has generated a 
thriving entrepreneurial economy (Webb 2007) but one that is broadly ignored and not 
directly supported by the state.   
 
Developmental states are likely to take strategic decisions on the sort of multinationals 
which they encourage to enter their country. Firstly they are unlikely to encourage the 
entry of market seeking multinationals per se. This would damage the development of 
home industry and the business groups which are central to the objectives of the 
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developmental state. However, they may be willing to encourage joint ventures or even 
acquisitions of home based companies when the purpose of such activity is to improve 
world class exporting capacity. As the developmental state seeks to move up the value 
chain, it is likely to engage in more intensive investment in its own human capital in 
order to bridge technology gaps but also to encourage such joint ventures as a way of 
accessing knowledge about world class manufacturing techniques and high level research 
and development. Encouraging this process has an impact on institutional processes. 
Overseas multinationals look for more transparency and accountability in firms and 
business groups than was characteristic of the situation previously. They look for more 
established and protected property rights which are transparent and clear. In this way, the 
developmental state may find itself pressured to move away from its reliance on personal 
linkages fuelled by hidden financial transactions and concealed under weak systems of 
political representation.  
 
The internationalisation and modernisation of capital markets requires a number of 
changes. Firstly, they require an infrastructure of technology and expertise that is not 
available in the developmental state. Secondly they require a set of rules, regulations and 
regulatory expertise associated with transparency and governance that is also not 
available. Market seeking financial institutions accompanied by international lawyers, 
accountants and management consultants are likely to see this as a good market 
opportunity. Whilst the developmental state may be wary of going too quickly down the 
road of increasing the role of capital markets, it will be more open to this than business 
corporatist systems.  Carruthers and Halliday, for example, have described how the 
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efforts to reform bankruptcy laws in such states following the Financial Crisis has 
involved negotiated orders between internal actors in the state and local industry and 
external bodies such as the WTO, professional associations and experts, law and 
accounting firms and international bankers (Carruthers and Halliday 2006; Halliday and 
Carruthers 2007)  
 
A potential side effect of this may be the appearance within the developmental state of 
financial and legal multinationals with more diverse sets of expertise than previously. In 
particular, such financial multinationals may be interested in stimulating the small and 
medium sized businesses which were traditionally ignored by the coalition of politicians 
and business leaders that dominated the developmental state in its early phases. Small 
businesses may also be encouraged by a growing number of educated individuals who 
reject the strongly hierarchical model of organization that characterises the large firms. 
Also the growing internal market which was ignored by the concentration on global 
markets may be served by small businesses with adequate capitalisation. Finally the entry 
of foreign multinationals through joint ventures may also lead to more outsourcing than 
previously characterised the big business model and in this way add another stimulant to 
small and medium sized businesses. 
 
In conclusion, developmental states are likely to increasingly open themselves up for 
overseas multinationals. Whilst trying to direct and shape the terms on which these 
MNCs enter, the consequence is still likely to be significant institutional change. The 
dominant alliance between insider politicians and a group of favoured industrialists 
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facilitated in some cases by a system of bribery and favours becomes more open to public 
scrutiny and criticism as MNCs enter (Kwok and Tadesse 2006). A potential rift arises 
between ‘modernisers’ and the ‘old guard’ about the nature of the state and its 
relationship to business. Those seeking the renegotiation of this relationship are likely to 
range from overseas MNCs to labour organizations, consumer groups and small 
businesses as well as professional experts embedded in global accounting firms, 
management consultancies and law firms. The outcome of these struggles depends on the 
circumstances of particular societies but from the argument presented here it would likely 
to result in increasing institutional diversity. One set of institutions would evolve around 
the maintenance of the old relationships; another set of institutions evolves around the 
establishment of a modernised and internationalised large firm sector integrated with 
capital markets at home and overseas with increasing technical inputs, modernised work 
systems and a workforce with some rights of representation; and finally another set of 
institutions may evolve around the development of small firms funded through a more 
diverse system of capital allocation and connected into local and global supply chains.  
Whether such institutional diversity is stable or likely to lead to conflict and further 
change is unclear. However, institutional diversity seems likely to increase in the first 
instance in developmental states because of the impact of multinationals. 
 
Conclusions   
The paper has sought to identify how globalization and in particular the presence of 
multinationals has impacted on institutional diversity. In order to do that it has examined 
four types of capitalism where the degree and nature of diversity differs. The paper has 
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then shown how the entry of multinationals pursuing their own differentiated interests has 
impacted on the dominant alliances and structures of these different forms of capitalism. 
Broadly speaking, the argument has been that inclusive corporatist systems and 
developmental states are likely to increase their institutional diversity. This relates to how 
and why the dominant alliance is put under pressure by globalization and the entry of 
multinational firms. The business corporatist system is least likely to change because its 
dominant elites remain too interconnected and powerful to allow the entry of potentially 
destabilising multinationals. Liberal market economies are most open to multinationals 
seeking access to pursue a wide variety of strategies. Whilst it is tempting to assume that 
the dominance of market logics in these systems reveals a basic institutional 
homogeneity, the argument made in the paper differs somewhat. It suggests that one of 
the key elements of such systems is setting the rules of the market for all participants. So 
long as these underlying rules are accepted, firms have relative freedom in how they 
organize their resources. It is therefore possible for firms to develop what have been 
labelled here ‘weak institutional orders’ in which longer term, non-market relationships 
are developed and sustained. Thus paradoxically in some respects, liberal market 
economies may have the greatest institutional diversity of any of the systems considered 
in the sense that they may contain multiple sub-sets of these weak institutional orders. 
Table 2 summarises the argument;  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Such an approach differs from other ways of considering the topic. Firstly, it suggests 
that it is important to extend the analysis of the impact of MNCs from manufacturing into 
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the arena of financial and legal MNCs. These firms are highly influential in processes of 
institutional change. In the case of law firms, they are dependent on expertise and 
knowledge, primarily that embodied in particular individuals and teams. In the case of 
finance, individuals are also supported by IT systems for calculating, trading and 
exchanging but these are generally centrally constructed and rolled out globally. In the 
case of professional service firms, there is also dependence on some IT capital 
expenditure but in this area, the central importance of personal networks and contacts is 
also relevant. Secondly, this approach requires a focus on both MNCs and institutions and 
the way in which there is a dynamic interaction between the two. It is therefore driven by 
a form of actor-centred institutionalism rather than a structural determinist or culturalist 
view of institutional processes (Morgan 2005). Thirdly the paper has not been framed in 
terms of issues of convergence and divergence between systems but rather in terms of 
dynamics within systems and issues of diversity within systems. It suggests that what is 
occurring is primarily an increase in institutional diversity though in different ways 
depending on the initial circumstances. 
 
In conclusion the paper has argued that institutional diversity should be of central 
concern to our analysis of capitalism. In order to pursue the issue, however, it is 
necessary to be systematic about the nature of diversity and the way in which it emerges. 
This paper has concentrated on the impact coming from the entry of multinationals into 
particular contexts. There is no claim here that this is the only group of actors that can be 
considered in relation to this question but they are clearly an important one. It is 
hopefully clear that framing the issues in this way is a more fruitful and interesting way 
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of looking at institutional change and diversity within national systems of capitalism 
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Table 1: Types and sources of institutional diversity in different forms of capitalism 
 
 Liberal market Inclusive 
corporatist 
Business corporatist Developmental state 
Role of state Limited to setting 
rules of markets 
Engaged in 
coordinating system 
with social partners 
Engaged in supporting large 
business 




Weak  Strong amongst firms 
and labour: national 
coverage 
Strong national coverage amongst 
largest firms: weak amongst 
labour; weak amongst small firms 




Bound by national 
regulations and 
standards 
 Large firms set own labour 
management standards: strong firm 
level culture. Small firms weak 
and subject to power and 
exploitation of large firms 
Small number of large firms dependent on 
state support: inter-twined with politics. 
Other firms excluded and subject to power 





diversity strong at 
firm, sectoral and 
regional levels 
In formal terms, the 
system is open : 
potential for diversity 
weak but more 
possible in financial 
sector than 
manufacturing 
System is segmented: there is 
diversity but this is set within 
particular pattern of power of large 
firms.  
System is segmented; there is diversity but 





Table 2: Types of multinational activity and impact on different types of capitalism 








Market seeking activity Open to entry 
Competition based on 
transparent rules and 
regulations to sustain ‘fair’ 
markets 
Limited restrictions on 
innovating new types of 
markets 
Large home markets 
‘Older’ markets in 
manufactured products are 
formally open but tend to be 
dominated by insider 
incumbents 
Newer markets in financial 
and professional services 
have been opened up by 
international firms in this area 
Formally markets are open but 
structure of home based firms 
works through networks to 
limit access to final product 
markets. 
Resistant to the establishment 
of new markets that may 
undermine existing networks 
Generally resistant to market 
seeking MNCs which could 
undermine attempt to build up 
home industry. 
State is willing to compromise 
and welcome entry where 
MNC brings required technical 
expertise for upgrading and 
also access to global markets 
State may also welcome 
financial organizations seeking 
to develop capital markets 
Efficiency seeking activity  Relatively high cost but market 
flexibility and low cost of 
regulation make this a 
possibility (as does the low cost 
of exit) 
Costs of doing business tend 
to be high: costs of labour, 
costs of regulation; taxation 
Not suitable for economizing 
on costs 
Not a feasible option due to 
high costs of doing business, 
need for links to other firms 
and the state, dominance of 
internal labour markets 
Developmental state may offer 
a cheap and disciplined labour 
force plus state supported 
infrastructure and tax breaks 
encouraging MNC entry 
Strategic asset seeking 
activity 
Most key assets open to 
incomers 
Knowledge assets accessible 
through market mechanisms 
(remuneration packages at the 
individual level: M+A at the 
firm level) 
High on specialist knowledge 
and skill  
External labour market for 
skills weak though possible 
as skills are defined 
occupationally 
Potential for accessing 
knowledge through M+A low 
due to weak capital markets 
High on firm based specialist 
knowledge 
Dominance of internal labour 
markets makes it difficult for 
incomers to access skill and 
knowledge 
Strong informal networks not 
accessible to outsiders 
MNCs less likely to identify 
strategic assets. Rather the 
MNC may be seen by the state 
as a strategic asset and 
encouraged to enter. Some 
efforts by developmental states 
to upgrade education, skills and 
R+D may change this. 
Impact on institutional 
diversity 
Likely to become more diverse Increased diversity from 
growth of international sector 
linked to global finance 
separated from small and 
local firms 
Unlikely to be much change Increased diversity: growth of 
transparent firms and capital 
markets; severing of corrupt 
links between state and 
business: potential growth of 
small business sector. 
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